Aversions to Trust
François Pannequin and
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Anne Corcos: Université de Picardie & LEM-Université de Paris 2
No 2012038, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
In this article, we focus on two types of “aversion” which we deem essential aspects of the notion of trust: betrayal aversion (social) and ambiguity aversion (a special case of aversion to uncertainty). Based on trust-games studies in experimental economics and neuroeconomics, our main goal is to assess the conceptual, behavioral and neurobiological connections between betrayal and ambiguity aversions. From a social and individual psychological point of view the bottom line of our trusting behavior could be our general aversion to ambiguous signals. We approach social trust in the terms of a phenomenon based on uncertainty aversion. Specifically, a reduction of the perceived uncertainty of a social interaction tends to build up a trusting climate conducive to trade by decreasing betrayal aversion. We hypothesize that betrayal aversion and ambiguity aversion bear such a negative correlation. Focusing on this potential negative correlation our approach clearly differs from more positive accounts of trust centred on altruism.
Keywords: Trust game; Betrayal aversion; Ambiguity aversion; Neuroeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 D87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Special Issue : Trust and Decision through Neuro-Economics
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Journal Article: Aversions to Trust (2012)
Working Paper: Aversions to trust (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2012038
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