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Private Benefits and Product Market Competition

Jacques Thépot
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Jacques Thépot: EM Strasbourg Business School, LARGE

No 2013031, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of private benefit extraction on the value of oligopolistic firms. Private benefits are assumed to generate costs that are passed on through the organizational structure and create price distortions in the downstream market for products. We show that this may positively affect the profits (i.e., the market value) of firms because the intensity of the rivalry is curbed by the increase in cost. In an oligopoly situation, private benefit extraction may enhance profits while still generating a welfare loss. This suggests that corporate governance cannot be divorced from competition policy in industries where managerial opportunism generates expropriation costs.

Keywords: Private benefits; Oligopoly; Agency Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Date: 2013-09-01
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