Strategic Interactions and Atoms' Power in Public Goods Economies
Hovav Perets and
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Hovav Perets: Israel Institute of Technology, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management
Benyamin Shitovitz: University of Haifa, Department of Economics
No 2013042, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium in a smooth public goods economy, described as a noncooperative game, where the set of players is a mixed-measure space of consumers. We assume a finite number of private goods. We show that under certain conditions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the economy, where the public goods are produced with a linear technology. Moreover, we discuss the difference in market power between an atomless sector and an atom with the same utility function and an atom with its split atomless sector in both a pure exchange economy and a public goods economy.
Keywords: Public Goods; Private provision of public goods; Nash equilibrium; Mixed measure space of consumers; Linear technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Special Issue : Recent Developments in Strategic Interactions and General Equilibrium
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2013042
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