A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Working Papers from Department of Economics, City University London
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.
Keywords: Matching; School Choice; Lotteries; Ex-Ante Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: A note on ex-ante stable lotteries (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:17/06
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