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A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Working Papers from Department of Economics, City University London

Abstract: We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.

Keywords: Matching; School Choice; Lotteries; Ex-Ante Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:17/06

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