Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation

Lin Liu () and Yuanzhu Lu ()
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Lin Liu: School of Business Administration, China University of Petroleum, Beijing Campus

No 452, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.

Keywords: Endogenous timing; public firm; private firm; vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
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Related works:
Journal Article: ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH ENDOGENOUS VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:wpaper:452

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