The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

Chenggang Xu
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Chenggang Xu: University of Hong Kong and WCU–SNU

No 621, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution -- a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure.

JEL-codes: O17 O18 O43 P21 P25 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2024-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna
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Published in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:wpaper:621

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