Liquidity, Bargaining, and Multiple Equilibria in a Search Monetary Model
No 63, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics
In this paper I construct a search monetary model with capital accumulation where money and goods are both divisible. Agents in matches determine the terms of trade through a sequential bargaining process and they face trading restrictions that require the quantity of money traded not to exceed what the buyer brings into the match. I show that sellers¡¯ share of the match surplus decreases with the severity of the trading restrictions. Such endogenous surplus shares generate multiple, self-fulfilling monetary steady states. When liquidity is interpreted as the number of transactions, the steady state with higher aggregate activities has higher liquidity. In both steady states, an increase in the money growth rate increases aggregate output and consumption by increasing the number of matches.
Keywords: Money Search; Capital; Liquidity; Multiplicity; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E40 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2000-11, Revised 2001-10
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Published in Annals of Economics and Finance, Nov 2001, pages 325-351
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Journal Article: Liquidity, Bargaining, and Multiple Equilibria in a Search Monetary Model (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:wpaper:63
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