Why Totalitarian Regimes Fall: A Unified Model of Power, Conformity, Dissent, and Entropy

Heng-Fu Zou ()

No 767, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a comprehensive mathematical framework for analyzing the internal dynamics, fragility, and inevitable collapse of totalitarian regimes. Drawing upon foundational criteria established by Friedrich and Brzezinski, we construct a system of seven coupled nonlinear differential equations that capture the interdependent evolution of ideol ogy, political power, coercive force, citizen conformity, dissent, economic extraction, and systemic entropy. The model integrates principles from dynamical systems theory, nonequilibrium thermodynamics, and neural systems analysis to show that totalitarian regimes are structurally unstable. Simulations reveal three distinct phases in a regime's trajectory -- consolidation, metastable stagnation, and nonlinear collapse driven by endogenous entropy accumulation and the regime's inherent inability to process dissent or adapt to disorder. A thermodynamic reinterpretation frames these regimes as dissipative structures that become energetically unsustainable, while a cognitive-neural analog demonstrates their eventual failure as signal-processing systems. Historical episodes-from Stalinist repression and Nazi collapse to the final decades of the Soviet Union -- are shown to conform to this general law of structural breakdown. We conclude by stating a unified law of totalitarian collapse: any regime that overcentralizes signal and suppresses feedback will generate entropy faster than it can dissipate it, leading inevitably to systemic failure.

Keywords: Totalitarianism; system collapse; entropy; nonlinear dynamics; thermodynamics; Wilson–Cowan model; cognitive regimes; ideology; political power; dissent; neural instability; adaptive failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2025-06-04
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