Between plurality and proportionality: an analysis of vote transfer systems

László Csató

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: The paper considers a general model of electoral systems combining district-based elections with a compensatory mechanism in order to implement any outcome between strictly majoritarian and purely proportional seat allocation. It contains vote transfer and allows for the application of three different correction formulas. Analysis in a two-party system shows that a trade-off exists for the dominant party between the expected seat share and the chance of obtaining majority. Vote transfer rules are also investigated by focusing on the possibility of manipulation. The model is applied to the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary election. Hypothetical results reveal that the vote transfer rule cannot be evaluated in itself, only together with the share of constituency seats. With an appropriate choice of the latter, the three mechanisms can be made functionally equivalent.

Keywords: electoral systems; mixed-member systems; vote transfer; two-party system; Hungary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2015/06

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