Quota bonuses as localized sales bonuses

Barna Bakó and András Kálecz-Simon

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: Managerial bonus schemes and their effects on firm strategies and market outcomes are extensively discussed in the literature. Though quota bonuses are not uncommon in practice, they have not been analysed so far. In this article we compare quota bonuses to profit-based evaluation and sales (quantity) bonuses. In a duopoly setting with independent demand shocks we find that under certain circumstances choosing quota bonuses is a dominant strategy. This may explain the widespread use of quota bonuses in situations where incentive problems are relevant.

Keywords: strategic delegation; oligopoly; managerial incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D21 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hrm and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2016/01

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