New European Banking Governance and Crisis of Democracy: Insights from the European post-socialist periphery
Dora Piroska and
Ana Podvršič
Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest
Abstract:
In this article, we argue that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the European Union, not only severely constrains peripheral member states’ governments in their policy choices, but more profoundly rearranges their government institutions in a way to restrict sovereign banking policy formation. Furthermore, amending the most dominant narratives of the EU’s impact on national banking policy, which point either at the role of the Economic and Monetary Union, or the Banking Union, we argue that it is also and most profoundly the organization of the Single Market and the various changes made to its architecture that influence EU member states’ banking policy. Finally, and most importantly, building on the case study of the post-crisis bank restructuring in Slovenia we reinvigorate the debate on the contribution of economic policy to the crisis of democracy in the EU by demonstrating the strong effect of the European banking governance on decreasing democratic oversight of banking policy in member states.
Keywords: Slovenia; banking; state aid; fiscal policy; central bank; Banking Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E62 F55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2018/05
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