Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games

Ferenc Forgó

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ. Sci. Budapest, 39(1996) 175-179) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly games. If for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be convex. Analogously, if for another specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then revenue functions of the firms must be concave in their respective variables.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Cournot oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ore
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