Which Social Choice Rule is More Dictatorial?

Dezső Bednay, Balázs Fleiner and Attila Tasnádi

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: Social choice rules (SCRs) aggregate individual preferences to social preferences. By Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem there does not exist a non-dictatorial SCR satisfying three desirable properties. Considering this negative axiomatic result, in this paper we determine distances of SCRs from the dictatorial rules to rank common SCRs. In particular, we apply the Kendall tau, the Spearman rank correlation and the Spearman footrule metrics. We find that from the investigated SCRs the Borda, the Copeland and the Kemény-Young SCRs stand out. Furthermore, we show that anonymous SCRs approach the constant rule when the number of alternatives is fixed and the number of voters tends to infinity.

Keywords: Simulation; Asymptotic behavior; Dictatorship; Kendall tau; Spearman rank correlation; Spearman footrule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/8100/ original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2023/03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest 1093 Budapest, Fõvám tér 8.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adam Hoffmann ().