ASYMMETRIC TOURNAMENTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAWS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULT

Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Keywords: economic theory; economic equilibrium; experiments; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1990
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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results (1992)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results (1987)
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