Balancing the Scales: Halakha, the Firm, and Information Asymmetries

J. Prager

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: Sellers are typically better about product quality and sales practices than are purchasers, and might be tempted to exploit their superior knowledge to deceive buyers. Firms themselves, buyers, and third-parties attempt to level the playing field with a variety of confidence-building measures, including reputational signals, purchaser monitoring, and government regulations. This pragmatic approach has its echoes in Halakha --Jewish law-- which, too, was concerned about information asymmetries and which introduced countervailing measures.

Keywords: INFORMATION; ENTERPRISES; MANAGEMENT; LAW (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D63 K42 L15 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1996
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