On Candidate-Based Analyses of Assembly Elections

J.P. Benoit and L.A. Kornhauser

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable.

Keywords: ELECTIONS; POLITICS; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1996
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