Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups

Andrew Schotter

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: What we find is that teh match between vulnerability and trust is a key ingredient into what makes a group of workers work well together along with the type of coordination problem that is created by the equilibrium of the incentive scheme.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:96-32

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