The Choquet Bargaining Solutions

Efe Ok and Lin Zhou

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of Rn+. Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as Choquet bargaining solutions. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choque bargaining solutions.

Keywords: BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: The Choquet Bargaining Solutions (2000)
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