General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information
Alberto Bisin () and
Piero Gottardi ()
Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). We consider economies where non-exclusive contracts (securities) with payoffs dependent on the agents' private information are traded on competitive markets. It is shown that the existence of competitive equilibria is not guaranteed under the dame set of assumptions as with symmetric information.
Keywords: ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
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Working Paper: General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric Information (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:97-38
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