An Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

Juan Dubra ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: In 1972, Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solution. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. By dropping symmetry and adding a restrivted version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to the set of axioms that lead to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, I characterize an asymmetric version of that solution concept that depends only on one parameter.

Keywords: BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (2001)
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