The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games
Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision-theoretically equivalent formulations of the type space. These different formulations correspond to different ways of encoding tha realizations of randomizations in the type of a player. Solution concepts, assumptions or paradoxes in games should be independent of the formulation of the game used. I refer to this axiom as TIGER, for "Type Independence among Games which are equivalently Re-formulated".
Keywords: GAMES; LEARNING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 D81 D82 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
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