Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts
Alberto Bisin () and
Danilo Guaitoli ()
Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: the agents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot be monitored ( or are not contractible upon).
Keywords: EFFICIENCY; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
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Journal Article: Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts (2004)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:98-24
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