Working Papers
From C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012.
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- 91-67: Financial Integration with and without International Policy Coordination
- Roberto Chang
- 91-66: Growth Accounting with Physical and Human Capital Accumulation
- Jess Benhabib and Mark Spiegel
- 91-65: Coordination and Spillovers
- Boyan Jovanovic
- 91-64: A Model of Project Evaluation with Limited Resources
- Sharon Gifford and Charles Wilson
- 91-63: Incomplete Markets
- Charles Wilson
- 91-62: Theories Consistent Expectationa and Exchange Rate Dynamics
- Michael D. Goldberg and Roman Frydman
- 91-61: Multi-Defendant Settlements: The Case of Superfund
- Lewis A. Kornhauser, Richard L. Revesz and Keith T. Takeda
- 91-60: An Experimental Study of Two-Actor Accidents
- Lewis A. Kornhauser and Andrew Schotter
- 91-59: Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns
- Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer
- 91-58: Equilibrium Visions
- Mario J. Rizzo
- 91-57: The Effects of Public Infrastructure and R&D Capital on the Cost Structure and Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Industries
- M. Ishaq Nadiri and Theofanis Mamuneas
- 91-56: An Optimal Constitution in a Stochastic Environment
- A.S. Pinto Barbarosa and Boyan Jovanovic
- 91-55: Imperfect Price-Reversibility of U.S. Gasoline Demand: Asymetric Responses to Price Increases and Declines
- Dermot Gately
- 91-54: Alfred Marshall in Retrospect
- James F. Becker
- 91-53: Evolution and Design in the East European Transition
- Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski
- 91-52: Privatization and Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe: Can a Market Economy Be Designed?
- Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski
- 91-51: Learning and agreeing to disagree without common priors
- Yaw Nyarko
- 91-50: The Convergence of Bayesian Belief Hierarchies
- Yaw Nyarko
- 91-49: Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?
- Charles de Bartolome
- 91-48: On the Transition to a Monetary Union
- Roberto Chang
- 91-47: Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations
- Roberto Chang
- 91-46: Social Conflict, Growth and Inequality
- Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini
- 91-45: Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
- Steven Brams, Ann E. Doherty and Matthew L. Weidner
- 91-44: Variable Markups in a Model with Adjustment Costs: Econometric Evidence for U.S. Industry
- Marzio Galeotti and Fabio Schiantarelli
- 91-43: Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
- Steven Brams and Alan D. Taylor
- 91-42: Price Margins and Capital Adjustment: Canadian Mill Products and Pulp and Paper Industries
- Jeffrey Bernstein
- 91-41: Delivery Lags, Adjustment Costs, and Econometric Investment Models
- Bob Chirinko and Fabio Schiantarelli
- 91-40: Cohort Size and Schooling Choice
- Christopher Flinn
- 91-39: Most Games Violate the Harsanyi Doctrine
- Yaw Nyarko
- 91-38: Arbitration Procedures
- Steven Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and Samuel Merrill
- 91-37: Adjustment Costs in Stagnant and Rapidly Growing Industries
- Shinichiro Nakamura
- 91-36: Fiscal Increasing Returns, Investment and International Capital Movements
- Andres Velasco
- 91-35: Scoring Reversals: A Major League Dilemma
- Jean-Pierre Benoit
- 91-34: Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
- Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna
- 91-33: Social Choice in a Representative Democracy
- Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- 91-32: Voting Simply in the Election of Assemblies
- Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- 91-31: A Generic Negotiation Game
- Steven Brams
- 91-30: An Adjustment Cost Model of Long-Term Employment
- Shinichiro Nakamura
- 91-29: Games Theory and Literature
- Steven Brams
- 91-28: An Econometric Analysis of Government Tenure Histories: The Italian Case
- Antonio Merlo
- 91-27: When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
- Steven Brams and Ben D. Mor
- 91-26: Level and Growth Effects of Human Capital: A Cross-Country Study of the Convergence Hypothesis
- George Kyriacou
- 91-25: Experimentation and Learning in Laboratory Experiments: Harrison’s Criticism Revisited
- Antonio Merlo and Andrew Schotter
- 91-24: The Aggregate Effects of Monetary Externalities
- Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer
- 91-23: Sprayed to Death: On the Lock-in of an Inferior Pest Control Strategy
- Robin Cowan
- 91-22: Social Conflict, Growth and Income Distribution
- Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini
- 91-21: Investment, Depreciation and Capital Utilization: Theoretical and Simulation Results
- Jeffrey Bernstein and M. Ishaq Nadiri
- 91-20: Imperfect Price-Reversibility of Oil Demand: Responses to Price Declines and Recoveries
- Dermot Gately
- 91-19: Private-Beliefs Equilibrium
- Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer
- 91-18: Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer