Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement

Lisa Anderson and Sarah Stafford ()
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Sarah Stafford: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

No 17, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: This paper presents a classroom game in which students choose whether or not to comply with pollution regulations. By changing the level of monitoring and fines for noncompliance across periods, the game shows students how the probability and severity of enforcement affects incentives for compliance. The game can be adapted for settings other than environmental regulation and can be used in a variety of classes including regulation, law and economics, environmental economics, public economics, or the economics of crime. It can easily be conducted in a fifty-minute class period.

Keywords: Classroom Experiment; Non-Compliance; Pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A22 C90 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2005-05-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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