Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence

Lisa Anderson, Beth Freeborn and Charles Holt

No 73, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with Potters and Suetens (2007) who observe tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market context.

Keywords: collusion; Bertrand; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2008-07-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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