Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction

Spencer Dale (), Athanasios Orphanides and Par Osterholm ()
Additional contact information
Spencer Dale: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Par Osterholm: Uppsala University

No 2008-1, Working Papers from Central Bank of Cyprus

Abstract: Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. If the public is able to assess accurately the quality of the imperfect information communicated by a central bank, such communication can inform and improve the public’s decisions and expectations. But if not, communicating imperfect communication has the potential to mislead and distract. The risk that imperfect communication may detract from the public’s understanding should be considered in the context of a central bank’s communications strategy. The risk of distraction means the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public’s understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.

Keywords: Transparency; forecasts; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction (2011)
Working Paper: Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction (2008)
Working Paper: Imperfect Central Bank Communication - Information versus Distraction (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cyb:wpaper:2008-1

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