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The value in games with restricted cooperation

Emilio Calvo () and Esther Gutiérrez-López ()
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Esther Gutiérrez-López: Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV. Universidad del País Vasco U.P.V./E.H.U.

No 115, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: We consider cooperative games in which the cooperation among players is restricted by a set system, which outlines the set of feasible coalitions that actually can be formed by players in the game. In our setting, the structure of this set system is completely free, and the only restriction is that the empty set belongs to it. An extension of the Shapley value is provided as the sum of the dividends that players obtain in the game. In this general setting, we offer two axiomatic characterizations for the value: one by means of component efficiency and fairness, and the other one with efficiency and balanced contributions.

Keywords: TU-games; Restricted cooperation; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-net
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