Weighted Solidarity Values

Emilio Calvo Ramón () and Esther Gutiérrez ()
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Esther Gutiérrez: Universidad del País Vasco/EHU

No 212, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: We present a noncooperative bargaining protocol among n players, applied to the setting of cooperative games in coalitional form with transferable utility. In this model, players are chosen randomly to make proposals until one is accepted unanimously, and after each proposal rejection, the probability that players leave the game increases. If after a rejection, some players withdraw the bargaining, the remaining players continue the process. We define a new family of values, called the weighted solidarity values, and we show that these values arise as the associated equilibrium payoffs of this bargaining protocol. In these values players have an altruistic behavior between them as the null player property is not satisfied.

Keywords: n-person bargaining; coalitional games; altruism; Solidarity value; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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