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Asymmetric players in the Solidarity and Shapley values

Emilio Calvo () and Esther Gutiérrez-López ()
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Esther Gutiérrez-López: Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV. Universidad del País Vasco U.P.V./E.H.U.

No 217, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: We present a general bargaining protocol between n players in the setting of coalitional games with transferable utility. We consider asymmetric players. They are endowed with di¤erent probabilities of being chosen as proposers and with di¤erent probabilities of leaving the game if o¤ers are rejected. Two particular speci…cations of this bargaining protocol yield equilibrium proposals that we refer to as weighted solidarity values and weighted Shapley values. We compare the behavior of these values when the players’ probabilities are changed. We supplement the analysis with axiomatic characterizations of both values.

Keywords: n-person bargaining; transferable utility games; asymmetric players; solidarity value; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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