A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
Emilio Calvo () and
Esther Gutiérrez-López ()
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Esther Gutiérrez-López: Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV. Universidad del País Vasco U.P.V./E.H.U.
No 414, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES
The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We demostrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the α-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
Keywords: Discounted Shapley value; egalitarianism; cooperative TU-games JEL (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0414
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