Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil

Gustavo Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Simeon Nichter

No 1463, Research Department working papers from CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica

Abstract: Political clientelism is considered a fundamental reason why politicians are not accountable and responsive to their constituencies. In this working paper, we study whether transparency initiatives – more specifically, top-down anti-corruption audits – can reduce the incidence of vote-buying and political clientelism in the context of Brazil’s municipal government anti-corruption program. This program selected municipalities at random to audit municipal finances, which allows for causal inference. We combine the audit program data for a sample of municipalities in the country’s Northeast region with a dedicated longitudinal survey we conducted in 2011-2013 of a large representative sample of impoverished rural households. This enables us to estimate short and long-term effects of the government anti corruption audits on subsequent levels of vote-buying and political clientelism.

Keywords: Corrupción; Democracia; Fortalecimiento institucional; Gobernabilidad; Investigación socioeconómica; Sector público (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1463

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