EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Why Do Banks Have So Much Debt In Tax Havens?

Lorenzo Garlanda-Longueville, Mathias Lé and Kevin Parra Ramirez
Additional contact information
Lorenzo Garlanda-Longueville: Université Paris Nanterre - EconomiX, Banque de France
Mathias Lé: Banque de France
Kevin Parra Ramirez: Banque de France, Sciences Po

No 36, Working Papers from EU Tax Observatory

Abstract: Tax havens represent the largest financing hub for financial institutions. For banks, they account for more than 20% of all cross-borders banking debt worldwide. Yet, our understanding of the underlying drivers remains limited. Drawing on a unique global dataset covering major international banks and tax havens – and employing a novel approach to isolate regulatory arbitrage – this paper finds that the location of cross-border intra-group debt held by multinational banks is shaped by tax considerations, even when regulatory differences are taken into account. For the first time, we provide direct evidence of profit shifting via debt shifting on a global scale, overcoming a key limitation of existing studies which typically rely on single-country data. Based on our sample data, we show that the magnitude of “excess” offshore banking debt globally recorded in tax havens is significant.

Keywords: Profit shifting; Debt shifting; Multinational banks; Taxation; Intragroup transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 F34 G21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2025-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.taxobservatory.eu//www-site/uploads/20 ... bt-In-Tax-Havens.pdf Full working paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbp:wpaper:036

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from EU Tax Observatory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Inga Chilashvili ().

 
Page updated 2026-01-07
Handle: RePEc:dbp:wpaper:036