Strategically Stable Technological Alliance
Nikolai V. Kolabutin and
Nikolay Zenkevich ()
DEGIT Conference Papers from DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade
There are two conditions that are important to investigate the stability problem when considering the long-term cooperative agreements: the dynamic stability (time consistency), and strategic stability. This paper presents the results based on the profit distribution procedure (PRP), which implement a model of stable cooperation. The paper also shows the relationship between the dynamic and strategic stability of cooperative agreement and the numerical results showing the influence of parameters on the character of participants’ development.
Keywords: Differential Game; Coalition; Shapley Value; Dynamic Stability; Strategic Stabilty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:deg:conpap:c016_055
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