A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology

Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: In this paper we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods some of which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a two way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generales the possibility of indeterminacies and multiple self fulfilling equilibrium paths in cultural change and politics. We provide then a rationale for ideologies and collective socialization institutions as coordination mechanisms allowing cultural groups to preserve or shift political power in favor of their preference profile in the long run.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 16, pp. 5-29.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology (2000)
Working Paper: A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:1999-13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().