Reciprocity, Harmonisation and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures: a Political Economy Perspective

Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann and Thierry Verdier

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper discusses the issue of regulatory protectionism and its implication for reciprocity and international bargaining on regulation. In a simple two way trade model a la Brander and Spencer, we take into account the three following features of regulatory measures: a) a regulation raises the cost not only of foreign producers but also of domestic producers, b) a regulation creates a fixed cost which is entirely supported by foreign exporters, c) a regulation may provide a welfare gain valued per se by individuals or to correct some market failure. In this context, we investigate the political economy forces for unilateral regulatory protectionism and the effectiveness of various intra-sectorial bargaining schemes (negotiated reciprocal regulation setting, harmonization or mutual recognition agreements) to ensure reciprocal market access.

Keywords: PROTECTIONISM; MODELS; TRADE; MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2000-28

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).