On stability and incentives in hierarchies

Gabrielle Demange

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: Situations where a group of individuals takes collective decisions are subject to instabilities when subgroups may form. In this paper, we analyze how a hierarchical organization avoids such instabilities, while distributing some power among the subordinates and the subgroups they may form. Incentives to reveal private information are also studied.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2001-09

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