Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One ?
Michael Bordo () and
Pierre Hautcoeur ()
DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)
We show that the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilize immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless, a stabilization was historically possible from early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system.
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Working Paper: Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? (2007)
Working Paper: Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-15
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