Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One ?

Michael Bordo and Pierre Hautcoeur

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We show that the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilize immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless, a stabilization was historically possible from early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? (2007)
Working Paper: Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? (2007)
Working Paper: Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-15

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