Voting on mass immigration restriction

Francesco Magris and Giuseppe Russo

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We study how immigration policies are determined under voting in a model where immigration redistributes income from wages to capital, migration decisions are endogenous, there exist border enforcement costs and preference for home-country consumption. We model the migration policy as a pure entry rationing rather than a necessarily porous screening system. Unlike the existing results of polarization, our findings show that preferences about frontier closure are distributed on a continuum going from total closure to total openness. Thus, the Condorcet winning immigration policy may well be an interior solution. Our results fit the real-life observation that both perfect closure and perfect openness are rare events. We also study the case of a referendum over two alternative policies and show that its outcome depends upon the location of the median voter with respect to the individual indifferent between the two alternatives.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting on Mass Immigration Restriction (2005)
Working Paper: Voting on Mass Immigration Restriction (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2004-27

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