Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment

Gilles Saint-Paul

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We study, in a model with unemployment, how labour market status affects the preferences for public spending, whether in the form of a public good or subsidies. We then derive the implications for the dynamics of government expenditures, under the hypothesis of majority voting.

Keywords: VOTE; VOTING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; UNEMPLOYMENT; POLITICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:96-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).