Nonemptiness of the Core: Low Multidimensional Decisions Spaces and One-Dimensional Preferences

Gabrielle Demange and Roger Guesnerie ()

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We consider a Society which as to make a finite dimensional collective decision, and study the "stability" of the public arrangements made in the Society when considering the threats that potential coalitions may generate. We refer for that to the standard cooperative approach based on the concept of Core, and its extension, the stable coalition structures. The present analysis aims at finding conditions with economic appeal that insures the non-emptiness of the Core.

Keywords: POLITICS; HOUSEHOLD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:96-09

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