Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach

Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influences the ex post distribution of rents there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of society and the optimal degree of property rights enforcement subject to incentive constraints of the agents.

Keywords: PROPERTY RIGHTS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1996
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Published in The Economic Journal, 108(450), 1998

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Related works:
Journal Article: Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach (1998)
Working Paper: Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach (1996)
Working Paper: Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:96-12

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