The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-Seeking Societies

A. Ades and Thierry Verdier

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper analyzes how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented.

Keywords: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-seeking Societies (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:96-13

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