Land Tenure Insecurity as an Investment Incentive: The Case of Migrant Cocoa Farmers and Settlers in Ivory Coast
Catherine Bros (),
Alain Desdoigts () and
Hugues Kouadio ()
No DT/2017/12, Working Papers from DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation)
This study sets forth a positive relationship between tenure insecurity and investments over dierent time horizons among cocoa farmers in Ivory Coast. This positive relationship stands in stark contrast to results found in many related studies. We argue this dierence stems from the type of crops considered and, in particular, whether one considers annual and/or perennial crops. Given that cultivating perennial crops such as cocoa requires large upfront investments over a long period of time, it is of paramount importance to retain control over the land in the long run, especially when the trees reach full maturity. According to some theoretical arguments, investing is a way to retain such control when the farmer does not have administrative rights. Our results show that cocoa farmers whose status remains precarious in terms of tenure security (migrants) have a higher propensity to invest, especially when the tree is about to yield substantially. This study thus underlines the need to account for the life cycle of crops and the associated revenue streams when assessing the relationship between tenure (in-)security and investment.
Keywords: Tenure security; investment time horizons; crop life cycle; outsiders; Ivory Coast. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 O13 O17 O55 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-agr and nep-dev
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