Shareholders' activism. A comparison between the United Kingdom and France
No 1001201, Working Papers CREGO from Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations
This paper provides new insights into the strategic alignment of specific minority dissident coalitions who influence or try to influence the decisionmaking process. With the corporate governance literature and a descriptive approach based on two samples : 79 French quoted companies from 1989 to 2000 and 57 British listed companies from 1992 to 2000, we try to identify the characteristics of the French and the British shareholders' activism. This activism is a contest process composed by influence activities, such as lobbying activities, proxy contests or judicial activities and initiated by non controlling shareholders, such as institutional or individual investors and shareholders' association. The study of the identity of dissident shareholders, the forms of activism and the activism's objectives depending on investment policy permit us to compare, two new models, French and British activism to the American model examined by the corporate governance theory.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1001201
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Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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