Opportunism, Stewardship, and the Dynamics of Conflict in a Theory of Corporate Governance
Peter Wirtz ()
Working Papers CREGO from Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations
This paper aims at increasing conceptual precision with respect to the role of conflict in a theory of corporate governance. It searches to complement traditional approaches to governance problems, typically conducted according to an exclusively disciplinary perspective, by introducing a cognitive argument. The latter allows for an explanation of conflict in situations where the CEO, far from always pursuing opportunistic aims, is himself convinced of having the conduct of a good steward. The case study of a hostile takeover attempt illustrates the proposed explanation and shows that certain governance mechanisms are capable of initiating a learning process, inducing convergence of apparently conflicting interests.
Keywords: governance; conflict; mental pattern; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G34 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1020101
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Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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