Headquarters’ Control Capacity and the Choice of R&D Organizational Forms Abroad
Mehdi Nekhili (),
Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili and
Walid Cheffi ()
Additional contact information
Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili: Université de Bourgogne
Walid Cheffi: Groupe ESC Rouen
Working Papers CREGO from Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations
The paper aims to explain the choice of organizational forms by multinational companies (MNCs) when decentralizing abroad their R&D activities. We identify five main organizational forms: wholly owned green-field subsidiary, wholly owned acquired subsidiary, joint venture, cross-licensing agreements and unilateral licensing agreements. On the basis of questionnaires addressed to the R&D managers of American and European MNCs, we highlight that the choice of an organizational form is related to the firm’s capacity of control, performance measurement and incentive systems, to resolve the agency conflicts in each form. Our findings show that the internalization choice is underprivileged because of behavioral control difficulties. The possibility of ensuring a strategic performance evaluation of R&D activities favors the cross-licensing agreement over the joint venture choice. Finally, the choice of unilateral licensing agreements is not supported because of feasibility issues concerning the financial evaluation of the performance of R&D activities.
Keywords: R&D; foreign investments; multinational companies; control mechanisms; organizational Forms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Headquarters' control capacity and the choice of R&D organizational forms abroad (2013)
Working Paper: Headquarters' control capacity and the choice of R&D organizational forms abroad (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090503
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers CREGO from Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Angèle RENAUD ().