Relazioni durature e mercati incompleti Parte I

Carlo Beretta ()

No dis1401, DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS)

Abstract: Perfect competition requires impersonal interactions. Coupled with moral hazard and asymmetric information, this precipitates on Nash equilibria that are generically Pareto inefficient. What is claimed is that there are institutions which allow to reach cooperative equilibria as non cooperative equilibria of games generated by suitably designing interactions. This is applied to intertemporal decisions, in particular those concerning irreversible investment and employment relationships eywords: power, commitment, repeated games, cooperative games, coalition formation

JEL-codes: D52 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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