Relazioni durature e mercati incompleti Parte II

Carlo Beretta ()

No dis1402, DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS)

Abstract: Perfect competition requires impersonal interactions. Coupled with moral hazard and asymmetric information, this precipitates on Nash equilibria that are generically Pareto inefficient. The dangers associated to impersonality when markets are incomplete are illustrated in the case of saving and its employment in the purchase of either financial or real activities

JEL-codes: D52 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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