The Business of Piracy in Somalia

Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland ()

No 1033, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.

Keywords: Piracy; Somalia; Law Enforcement; Organised Crime; EU Atalanta (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 O17 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 p.
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Business of Piracy in Somalia (2011)
Journal Article: The Business of Piracy in Somalia (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1033

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