Collaborative Investor Engagement with Policymakers: Changing the Rules of the Game?

Camila Yamahaki and Catherine Marchewitz

No 2051, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: Applying universal ownership theory and drawing on multiple-case studies, this article analyzes what drives institutional investors to engage with government entities and what challenges they find in the process. We relied on document analysis and conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with representatives from asset owners, asset managers, investor associations, and academia. We identify a trend that investors conduct policy engagement to fulfill their fiduciary duty, improve investment risk management, and create an enabling environment for sustainable investments. As for engagement challenges, investors report the longer-term horizon, a perceived limited influence toward governments, the need for capacity building for investors and governments, as well as the difficulty in accessing government representatives. This research contributes to fill a gap in the literature on this new form of investor activism as a growing number of investors engage with sovereign entities on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.

Keywords: Shareholder engagement; dialogue; shareholder activism; climate risk; climate change; environmental social and governance (ESG); public policy engagement; sovereign engagement; sustainable finance; universal ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G23 G30 G32 G34 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 p.
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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